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Abstract 
The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third 
countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two 
decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military 
nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis 
cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict 
reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive 
approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider 
globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its 
neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also 
tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements 
with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s 
intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to 
become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles 
in addressing conflict situations? 
 
This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis 
management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s 
security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus 
amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of 
competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low 
legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to 
overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst 
Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other 
actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African 
Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this 
area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than 
leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens 
its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a 
secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at non-
traditional security.   
 
Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two 
missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the 
area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will 
argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of 
crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, 
present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and 
piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the 
region.   
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The European Union and global 
security: is the EU becoming the 
indispensable partner? 
 
DR CESARE ONESTINI 1 
Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the EU has developed its 
own civilian and military capabilities to react to 
international crisis and carry out crisis management 
interventions. EU treaties now contain the notion of a 
defence community, committed to the security of all its 
members, bound by a solidarity clause and ready to 
project a stabilizing reach around the globe. More 
recently, several decisions taken by the EU offered a 
glimpse into the efforts to raise the EU’s capability to 
act in a broad area of security. 
 
In December 2013 EU Heads of States and government 
took stock of the military capability developed so far 
and committed to closer cooperation in the context of 
the European Common Security and Defence Policy; 
they also focused on measures to stimulate a EU-wide 
defence industry and considered ways of pooling more 
national assets together through the European Defence 
Agency. In the December 2013 Council Conclusions, EU 
Heads of State and government underlined progress 
made but acknowledged the need to increase impact 
and visibility of EU crisis management actions. In 
particular they stated that  
“The numerous civilian and military crisis 
management missions and operations 
throughout the world are a tangible expression 
of the Union's commitment to international 
peace and security. Through CSDP, the Union 
today deploys more than 7000 staff in 12 
civilian missions and four military operations. 
The European Union and its Member States can 
bring to the international stage the unique 
ability to combine, in a consistent manner, 
policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, 
                                                        
1 Dr Cesare Onestini is the EU Visiting Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. The views 
and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 
European Union 
security and defence to finance, trade, 
development and justice”. 2 
At the end of last year, the High Representative and the 
European Commission issued a policy document 
pointing to a comprehensive approach to crisis 
management that the EU institutions want to promote3. 
This comprehensive approach would include mobilizing 
the economic and normative roles of the Union, and 
combining development and security to stabilize   the 
EU’s neighbourhood and around the world. 
 
However, despite all these efforts, the EU is still not 
perceived as a global security provider, and most of its 
interventions are in support of efforts led by other 
organisations or in partnership with other security 
providers.  
 
This paper will investigate the reasons behind the 
inability of the EU to become a more visible security 
provider, in spite of the growing number of EU 
deployments in crisis management situations.  It will 
look at how the EU is deploying its assets and 
capabilities and will look at the rationale behind it.  The 
paper then takes a closer look at EU presence and 
cooperation with countries in Asia to assess the current 
and potential role that it can play.  
 
This paper will be divided in three sections as follows: 
 
1. The first section looks at those crisis theatres in 
which the EU is already active.  This engagement 
takes many forms, from deployment of troops or 
civilian experts to financial support to the 
intervention of other actors (notably the African 
Union or other regional organisations) to 
contributing to the elaboration and 
implementation of sanctions or other measures 
aimed at helping peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
These different types of EU’s engagement in crisis 
situation will be considered briefly and will  focus 
in particular on three key characteristics that stand 
out:  
 
 The EU’s engagement is never unilateral  
 
                                                        
2 European Council Conclusions, December 2013, paragraph 5. 
3 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council. The EU’s Comprehensive 
Approach to external conflicts and crises. Brussels, 11.12.2013. JOIN 
(2013) 30 Final. 
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 EU’s engagement in crisis situations is always 
preceded, accompanied and followed by 
more long-term actions 
 
 EU’s crisis management missions and 
operations tend to be concentrated in a few 
regions, whilst EU’s stabilization and 
confidence building programmes have a 
wider geographic reach. 
 
2. The second section discusses why the EU 
engagement abroad is limited by ability to reach 
internal consensus. In other words, the need for 
internal legitimacy determines choices for external 
engagement. EU’s wide-ranging involvement in 
crisis management around the globe is not as 
visible or reported widely as that of some other 
actors because the EU is struggling with its internal 
legitimacy when it comes to interventions in the 
area of international security. There is a stronger 
focus on consensus building amongst the 28 
member states, than on the actions agreed at the 
end of the process. This is in part because there is 
still debate about the nature of the European 
Union acting simultaneously as a federation in 
some policy areas and as an intergovernmental 
structure in some others, notably concerning 
peace and security issues. EU’s Member States 
remain ambiguous about the role that they want 
the EU to play on the global stage in the security 
sphere, and each crisis gives raise to new 
discussions and new options for action, often 
ending with a strong EU component.  
 
 As a result the EU’s interventions abroad are 
almost always in support of some other partner 
or in conjunction with more visible actors who 
have a clearer legitimacy for intervention. 
 
 EU internal decision making for crisis 
intervention remains anchored in inter-
governmental bargaining and seeking consensus. 
As a result the EU tends to be reactive, and 
sometimes perceived as slow and focused only 
on a few geographic areas.  
 
 However, as the EU and its Member States 
gather more and more experience in crisis 
management, partnerships with other player 
become more consolidated (especially with the 
United Nations, African Union, OSCE, World Bank) 
and options for intervention become more 
standardized.  
 
3. The third section of the paper looks at Asia, an 
area in which EU’s civilian and military crisis 
management intervention has been limited to 
Afghanistan and Aceh. The paper looks beyond 
formal civilian and military interventions, and 
elaborates on numerous areas in which the EU has 
been very active in cooperation with partners in 
South East Asia. Looking, for example, at the role 
of the EU in Myanmar’s transition or the support 
of mediation efforts in the Philippines, the paper 
shows that the EU’s role is far more articulated 
than usually portrayed. The EU has thus become a 
useful and desirable partner to support the 
resolution of tensions or conflicts – and this role 
will continue to evolve potentially making the EU 
an indispensable partner in conflict prevention and 
crisis management and post-crisis stabilization 
processes. 
 
1. The European Union’s involvement 
in Crisis Management 
 
The EU is already active in many ‘crisis’ theatres around 
the world and has been engaged over many years. This 
engagement takes many forms, from deployment of 
troops or civilian experts to financial support to the 
intervention of other actors (notably the African Union or 
other regional organisations) to contributing to the 
elaboration and implementation of sanctions or other 
measures aimed at helping peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. In section one below we will consider briefly 
these different types of EU’s engagement in crisis 
situation and will focus on three key characteristics: EU’s 
engagement is never unilateral; EU’s engagement in crisis 
situations is always preceded, accompanied and followed 
by more long-term actions; EU’s crisis management 
missions and operations tend to be concentrated in a few 
regions, whilst EU’s stabilization and confidence building 
programmes have a wider geographic reach. 
 
After the manifest deficiencies in the EU’s reaction to 
the conflict at its doorstep that tore apart Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s, the EU countries decided to develop an 
intervention capacity, capable of deploying both 
military and civilian assets. The European Commission 
with its offices in third countries already had a strong 
expertise in development and assistance programmes, 
often including security elements, such as support to 
Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes, border controls, and support to civilian 
administrations. 
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Progressive development of capabilities 
 
These tools were complemented over ten years ago by 
new capabilities to deploy in crisis areas and in 
particular the following: 
  
 Dedicated civilian and military structures to be 
deployed in crisis area and able to count on rapid 
reaction, clear chains of command and dedicated 
financial provisions.  
 
 Unlike the assets managed by the Commission, the 
crisis management capacity of the EU was 
developed by Member States within the Council of 
Ministers, thereby transforming the Council 
Secretariat from a support structure for Council 
meetings and for the rotating presidency, into a 
body with responsibility for the preparation of all 
decision making relating to crisis management as 
well as for the conduct of missions and operations. 
 
 Moreover, EU member states set up new bodies to 
accompany the full crisis cycle; the highest organ, 
the Political and Security Committee, is a 
permanent Brussels-based Ambassador-level body, 
with representation from all Member States, 
meetings regularly and presiding over all crisis 
management decisions to be taken by the EU. 
Political authority still rests with the Council of 
Ministers (Ministers of Foreign Affairs in this case) 
but preparatory and implementation duties where 
delegated to the PSC and its sub-committees. 
 
 A full-time High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy was also appointed by Member 
States to steer these preparatory and 
implementation processes, to advice and submit 
options to the PSC, to take responsibility for the 
conduct of operations and to represent the EU 
foreign and security policy in third countries. 
 
Since the creation of these crisis management 
capabilities, the EU has deployed over 30 civilian 
missions and military operations , varying in length 
from a few months to almost ten years in Bosnia 
and varying in size from a relatively modest  (for 
example with 40 military and civilian experts 
deployed to RDC providing advice and assistance 
for security sector reform) to over two thousand 
personnel in Kosovo (civilian) or numerous vessels 
and airplanes for the Atalanta naval anti-piracy 
operation (military).  
 
All of EU missions and operations were deployed 
within an explicit UN mandate or as part of a strong 
international partnership and at the request of the 
receiving countries. 
 
A stronger institutional setup since 2009 
 
The latest streamlining and strengthening of EU’s 
external action entered into force in 2009 with the 
appointment of Catherine Ashton as High 
Representative/Vice President of the Commission, 
taking responsibility for: 
  
 the whole of the crisis management capabilities of 
the EU, including the existing civilian and military 
missions (with over 7000 personnel deployed);  
 
 political steering of the work of EU Foreign 
Ministers; 
 
 diplomatic, cooperation and assistance work 
carried out in third countries mainly by the 
European Commission; 
 
 the network of over 139 Delegations (Embassies) 
in third countries. 
 
To support her in carrying out these tasks, Catherine 
Ashton set up the European External Action Service, 
bringing together experts from the Commission, crisis 
management capabilities from the Council and 
diplomats from national foreign ministries.  
 
The EU’s engagement in crisis situation is not limited to 
military operations or civilian missions. As important 
and visible as some of these missions are in particular 
when a crisis becomes acute or tensions on the ground 
require quick intervention, the bulk of EU’s efforts is to 
be found as part and parcel of its ‘normal’ activities in 
mediation and conflict prevention, in development and 
humanitarian programmes.  Furthermore, partnerships 
and cooperation dialogues are being fostered with all of 
the major EU’s partners to ensure coherence and 
cohesion of action.  
 
A wide range of actions 
 
Last December, the High Representative and the 
European Commission adopted a joint text on the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis 
(JOIN 2013 – 30 Final). The aim of this policy is to make 
the ‘EU stronger, more coherent, more visible and 
more effective in its external relations’. 
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The broad spectrum of EU’s engagement in security 
can be seen in the variety of actions in which the 
EU takes part on a regular basis. These can be 
broadly characterized under three headings: (i) 
confidence building measures; (ii) focused political 
dialogues; (iii) targeted sanctions. 
Confidence building measures 
 
 A more active mediator. The EU especially in the 
last few years has developed a higher political 
profile in international mediation, as seen in the 
role played by the EU High Representative in the 
ongoing nuclear talks with Iran, or in the 
development of Kosovo/Serbia agreements.  
 
 International accountability. The EU continues to 
be one of the strongest backers of the International 
Criminal Court promoting accountability for the 
most serious and heinous crimes, when such 
prosecution cannot be carried out in the countries 
concerned.  
 
 Stability fund. The EU has a stability fund 
(instrument contributing to stability and peace) to 
support mediation and prevention, confidence 
building measures, generation of local capacity. 
These funds are subject to a quick disbursement 
procedure and often precede or complement 
civilian or military intervention. The instrument has 
been active for over ten years. Over the period 
2007 - 2013, the instrument has supported some 
294 crisis response and 124 crisis preparedness 
actions in some 70 countries or regions worldwide4. 
 
 Financial support and technical assistance. The EU 
provides regular capacity building support for 
peace and mediation operations of other 
international security providers, most notably the 
African Union; this support includes training in 
peace planning and operations, training for African 
Peace keeper, police and mediation techniques. For 
example the EU has funded the African Union’s 
deployment in Somalia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 For a recent overview of the activitiy of the stability fund see: 
European Commission. 2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for 
Stability. Brussels (2013) 563 Final, Brussels 26.7.2013. 
More focused political dialogues 
 
 Alignment with other international players; the EU 
is becoming more and more engaged in 
arrangements with other international actors to 
face complex security situations. The EU has been a 
member of the Middle East Quartet since its 
creation, and it provides funding and support for its 
work. The EU is also a major contributor and 
participant in groups of friends or international 
compacts such as the UN Group of Friends of 
Myanmar, the Group of Friends for Yemen, or the 
anti-piracy working party.  
 
 Political Dialogues are also part of EU’s measures 
that can be activated to influence the positive 
outcome in a crisis situation: development funds 
include provisions for political consultations and for 
suspension of aid  - and the EU is becoming less shy 
in applying these provisions (Fiji, Madagascar) 
 
 Security dialogues. The EU has deepened in the last 
five years its security dialogues with major partners. 
In particular in the area of anti-terrorism, the EU 
carries out regular dialogues with numerous 
partners, exchanging information and policies, and 
providing support to enforcement and monitoring. 
 
 Global challenges. The EU has taken a prominent 
role in fighting some of the new global threats, such 
as climate change or food insecurity. In doing so 
the EU has adopted provisions (thereby setting a 
standard at the normative level) and led 
international coalitions to bring about more 
coordinated policies with legally-binding targets. 
 
Targeted sanctions 
 
 Sanctions. Sanctions have become in the last few 
years a more visible part of EU’s response to crisis; 
from Ivory Coast to Belarus, from Myanmar to Iran, 
sanctions are a central element of EU’s action in 
crisis situation.  EU’s sanctions tend to be framed or 
refer to UN decisions, even if the EU does not 
refrain from using sanctions autonomously if and 
when required (and always as part of a wider 
political framework). Moreover EU sanctions are 
becoming more targeted and the range of options 
is becoming broader (from visa bans and 
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suspension of some trade preferences to arms 
embargos).5 
 
From this brief overview we can see that:  
 
 EU’s engagement is never unilateral. The EU tends 
to act in close cooperation with other international 
actors, notably the UN.  
 
 EU’s engagement in crisis situations is always 
preceded, accompanied and followed by more 
long-term actions;   
 
 EU’s crisis management missions and operations 
tend to be concentrated in a few regions, whilst 
EU’s stabilization and confidence building 
programmes have a wider geographic reach. 
 
2. Action abroad requires internal 
consensus 
 
The EU’s wide-ranging involvement in crisis management 
around the globe is not as visible or reported as that of 
some other actors because the EU is still struggling with its 
internal legitimacy. There is still debate about the nature 
of the European Union acting simultaneously as a 
federation in some policy areas and as an 
intergovernmental structure in some others, notably 
concerning peace and security issues. EU’s Member States 
remain ambiguous about the role that they want the EU 
to play on the global stage, and each crisis gives raise to 
new discussions and new options for action, often with a 
strong EU component.  
 
As a result EU’s interventions abroad are almost always in 
support of some other partner or in conjunction with 
more visible actors who have a clearer legitimacy for 
intervention. 
 
EU internal decision making for crisis intervention remains 
dominated by consensus and inter-governmental 
bargaining. As a result the EU tends to be reactive, 
sometimes slow and focused on few geographic areas.  
 
However, as the EU and its Member States gather more 
and more experience in crisis management, partnerships 
with other player become more consolidated (especially 
with the United Nations, African Union, OSCE, World 
Bank) and options for intervention become more 
standardized.  
                                                        
5 For an assessment of EU sanctions see: Clara Portela. The EU’s use 
of ‘targeted’ sanctions’: evaluating effectiveness. CEPS Working 
Documents n. 391/ March 2014. 
Ambitious goals 
 
The EU has agreed on ambitious goals for its role in 
contributing to global security. To quote the EU Treaty 
Art 2.5: 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and 
the protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. 
 
Moreover the Treaty also specifies that the Union’s aim 
should be to  
 
(art.21.2.c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts 
and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations Charter … 
 
The European Union see itself as a global security actor, 
going well beyond the UN Charter provisions for the 
roles of regional organisations in regional security 
(Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). 
 
Weak decision-making 
 
The EU continues to be work on progress. It has been 
defined by some as an integration process without an 
end goal. Treaties talk about an ever closer union, but 
leave open the question of what should be the final 
shape or nature of the Union.  
 
This ambiguity on the role and nature of the European 
Union is not necessarily bad for the incremental 
progress that has been needed in key internal policy 
areas, from the internal market to the setting up of 
cohesion and regional funds. Indeed in these policy 
areas, Member States have agreed to delegate 
important powers to Brussels and majority voting 
means that decisions are not brought down to lowest 
common denominator.  
 
Ambiguity about the nature of the EU however does 
not help in defining the external mandate of the 
European Union. And whilst Member States have 
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agreed to clear provisions for the EU to play a role in 
international trade negotiations (as an obvious 
corollary to the customs union and internal market they 
agreed to) they have not agreed to equally clear 
provisions for the role they want the EU to play in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. This is 
in part due to different expectations amongst Member 
States and the different roles they see for national 
versus European action; and in part due to the fact that 
some EU Member States are major actors in other 
security organizations such as France and UK in the UN 
Security Council, NATO or the OSCE and might prefer to 
take action in those settings depending on goals and 
the need for broader coalitions.  
 
As we have seen above, Member States have 
unanimously agreed to clear language in the EU 
Treaties giving the EU a mandate for action in the 
promotion of peace globally, and providing for 
structures and capabilities for crisis management. 
Decision-making accompanying the deployment of 
these tools however remains based on consensus, on 
voluntary contributions (especially when it comes to 
committing military or civilian capabilities) and on 
explicit authorization by the Council of Ministers.  
 
As a result, there is no standard operating procedure 
for how the EU will deal with a crisis; indeed there is a 
priori no criteria to determine whether the EU will 
intervene at all, depending on the evolution of national 
positions.  
 
Moreover, EU partners around the globe also hold 
different perceptions of the EU’s potential or actual 
role in security matters. The latest changes of the 
Lisbon Treaty which have reinforced the role of the 
High Representative and the EU’s ability to act are still 
being observed and digested. The more vocal and 
dynamic role of the EU in the UN since the Lisbon 
Treaty has also given a stronger voice and visibility to 
the tight coordination amongst EU Member States. But 
this process is just at the beginning and is not 
welcomed by all UN partners in equal measures – a 
position that is often to be interpreted more in terms of 
how they view the potential role of other regional 
organisations rather than reflecting directly on whether 
they welcome or not more EU engagement in these 
matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
A preference for partnerships 
 
The EU Treaty provisions for its external actions open 
with a statement of principle in favour of multilateral 
action in partnership with other organisations:  
 
(art 21.1) The Union shall seek to develop 
relations and build partnerships with third 
countries, and international, regional or global 
organisations which share the principles 
referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations. 
 
As the High Representative stated on the occasion of 
her annual dialogue with the UN Security Council in 
2013,   
 
The European Union's contribution (to peace and 
security) is three fold: 
 
• Our ability to marshall a wide range of 
instruments in what we call a comprehensive 
approach; 
• Our direct involvement in international 
negotiations, including mediation, on behalf 
of the international community; 
• By working closely with our international and 
regional partners, where only collective 
efforts can deliver results. 
 
As stated by the High Representative, and looking at EU 
interventions in support of peace and security, two 
trends can be observed: 
 
 EU tends to move quickly to a declamatory stage 
to seek consensus and international mobilization. 
Often a lead Member States pushes discussions 
and others provide the support. Sanctions seem to 
have become a favourite method to signal EU’s 
unity and disapproval whilst trying to influence 
facts on the ground; financial and other 
instruments managed by the Commission are 
often not ‘mobilisable’ in the short time-frames of 
a crisis, but the Commission tries to align its 
positions as close as possible to the ones adopted 
by the Council.  
 
 The appointment of an EU Special Representative 
would usually follow as a second-wave measure, 
also to explore further mediating roles.    Any such 
measure is framed and agreed by Member States, 
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but does not bind or limit national actions that 
might run in parallel. In this context, sanctions are 
becoming a tool of choice to give a clear indication 
of political unity, to encourage unity of the 
international community and to influence 
behaviour on the ground. It is only in the third 
stage, and in close consultation with the UN and 
other major partners, that the EU considers 
possible deployments;  
 
 Even in cases where there is no explicit EU 
agreement on a specific course of action, and 
where Member States might initially prefer 
different tactical solutions, Member States 
continue to work closely with one another on EU 
measures that might contribute to a resolution of 
the crisis. In other words, even in case of an 
explicit disagreement over the use of force as in 
Libya in 20116 or faced with the situation where 
one Member State decides to intervene even 
without a formal EU endorsement as in Mali in 
2013, Member States continue to value the option 
of EU action.  
 
It has been argued in this section that the ambiguous 
nature of the EU as a security provider on the 
international stage is closely linked to the issue of 
internal legitimacy, to Member States expectations and 
to interaction with other bodies. As a result the EU 
prefers to act in close cooperation with other ‘more 
legitimate’ bodies, as a way of strengthening its internal 
mandate (with its own MS) as well as its external 
mandate (in the eye of the receiving country or other 
players on the ground). 
 
It can be expected that this bias in favour of 
partnership will continue to become stronger.  Indeed it 
is argued that the need for acting in partnership with 
other international actors is closely linked to the EU’s 
weak internal legitimacy for interventions in foreign 
and security policy. On the positive side, the more the 
EU shows its ability to contribute in such partnerships 
the more its role will be sought out by others as well. 
The EU is already a strong partner (especially if 
measured in terms of contribution to crisis resolution of 
the EU and its Member States) for the UN, for 
numerous African sub-regional organisations and has 
                                                        
6  Even if EU MS were not united on the merits of military 
interventions in Libya they then quickly agreed on an arms embargo 
and reviewed options for no-fly zones, started preparations for 
possible EU flanking operations to boost UN humanitarian activity, 
was one of the first international actors to open an office in 
Benghazi and started work with the new authorities on border 
control operations.  
dialogues and formal links with other groupings such as 
ASEAN as a partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum.   
As the capacity of the EU to engage in crisis situation 
continues to grow and gather expertise and positive 
feedback, we can expect MS to be more willing to 
support this type of engagement – and in also 
considering the financial incentive of common action in 
today’s complex crisis areas. However as the EU will 
continue to remain limited by consensus-based and 
iterative decision making for these types of 
interventions, we can expect a growing need to 
develop partnerships with other actors, national and 
especially multilateral. If the trend continues as we 
have been observing over the past ten years, the EU 
will move from the desirable partner that it is now to 
possibly an indispensible partner for crisis management 
around the globe. 
 
3. The EU’s contribution to security in 
Asia 
 
Concerning Asia, EU’s crisis management intervention has 
been limited to Afghanistan and Aceh. Looking beyond 
formal civilian and military interventions, we can discover 
numerous areas in which the EU has been active in 
cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia. The EU’s role 
is far more articulated than usually portrayed and in many 
ways the EU has become a useful and desirable partner to 
support resolution of tensions or conflicts. This role will 
continue to evolve potentially making the EU an 
indispensible partner in conflict prevention and crisis 
management and post-crisis stabilization processes. 
 
HR/VP Ashton attended the ShangriLa dialogue in 2013, 
a first ministerial-level participation in this pre-eminent 
security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. On this occasion 
she summed up the EU’s role in the region as one 
based on partnership:  
 
“We believe we have a dual contribution to 
make to security in the region and beyond: first 
by offering to be a true long-term partner on 
security issues and second by being an effective 
and innovative one, through our ability to 
implement a comprehensive approach which is 
particularly suited to the new challenges we all 
face… . Today I am here to reinforce our deep 
commitment to promoting global security and 
prosperity, not as an Asian power, but an Asian 
partner.” 
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Numerous dialogue arrangements 
 
The EU is a major trade and economic partner for 
countries in the Asian region. The new-generation of 
partnership and cooperation agreements concluded 
with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Mongolia and Singapore provide an ambitious 
framework for cooperation in fighting terrorism, human 
trafficking, and countering proliferation. Talks are 
underway to have similar agreements with Brunei, 
Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Concerning anti-piracy in particular the EU has been co-
sponsoring events with ASEAN partners to look at the 
EU’s experience in combating piracy off the coast of 
Somalia through a comprehensive international 
mobilization that includes naval missions, support to 
stabilization inland, training of security forces and 
support to local regional anti-piracy capabilities.  
 
The EU is also a partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
exchanging views and working closely with all ASEAN 
partners on security issues affecting the region. 
Last year the EU participated with more than 60 people 
in disaster and relief exercises with ASEAN and other 
countries under the ARF. 
 
Taking a clear stance on growing tensions 
 
The growing tensions in the region over contested 
maritime borders between China and some ASEAN 
members as well as between China and Japan, are of 
great concern for the EU. 
 
The EU has made its position clear on numerous 
occasions, calling for diplomatic and pragmatic 
solutions, and doing so both publicly and privately.  
 
 Publicly, the EU takes position on the most 
relevant developments, while avoiding taking 
sides on territorial disputes. The HR/VP 
issued a statement on behalf of the EU 
addressing the establishment by China of the 
East China Sea ADIZ (covering disputed 
islands and accompanied by a non-specific 
threat in case of non-respect) in November 
2013. The spokesperson of the HR/VP also 
issued a statement on the visit of PM Abe to 
the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. The 
EU condemned both actions and called on 
both sides to do all they can in lowering 
tensions and building trust.  
 
 Privately, the EU keeps raising the issues at 
the highest political level, in summit 
meetings with all major parties involved (just 
in 2013 the EU had discussion at summit 
levels with ROK, Japan and China). 
 
EU and some countries in the Asia-Pacific region have 
also agreed on a framework to work together on 
civilian and military operations - a framework 
agreement with New Zealand has been signed and 
similar agreements are being finalized with Australia 
and South Korea for participation in EU-led missions. 
The EU encourages participation in worldwide missions 
from partners in the Asia-Pacific, opening new 
opportunities for partnership. 
 
Transferring the EU’s know-how 
 
The EU has also accumulated over the years a lot of 
experience about furthering regional integration, 
aligning Member States policies and developing 
common projects. This experience has been applied 
over the past twenty years to the development of 
cooperation in crisis management through an 
institutional incremental approach; in doing this, the EU 
has tried to identify and mobilise all tools at its disposal, 
from the economic to the diplomatic, from sanctions to 
confidence building measures.  
 
This experience can also be made available to partners, 
notably organisations such as ASEAN with an explicit 
aim of closer cooperation. As noted by Reiterer (2013)7: 
“The EU’s comprehensive approach on security 
with a strong soft power component to meet 
international challenges carries an appeal when 
the region’s other major partners are stressing 
hard power. In the process of building a 
regional architecture the EU’s expertise and 
experience in regional economic and political 
integration, including dispute avoidance, 
management and settlement, are assets in 
demand…” 
The EU-ASEAN bilateral cooperation programme, the 
Brunei Plan of Action, has been updated and adopted in 
2012. This plan envisages that both parties will expand 
                                                        
7 Reiterer, Michael. ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security 
in Asia’. European Foreign Affairs Review 19, no. 1 (2014): 1–22. © 
2014 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands 
 
EUC Background Brief No. 11 
 
 10 
cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as 
disaster response; border management; maritime 
cooperation. This will be complemented by support and 
peer exchanges on mediation with the emerging ASEAN 
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation where the EU can 
draw on it previous recent experience in Mindanao. 
Drawing on its experiences with Trans-European 
Networks, Single Market, the Schengen Area, public-
private partnerships, the EU will support ASEAN goals 
on ‘Connectivity’, which is an important unifying 
concept for ASEAN.  
 
EU’s current involvement in crisis 
management, mediation, transition in Asia 
 
The EU has also taken active part in supporting crisis 
resolution in different parts of Asia.  
 
 By far the biggest engagement is in Afghanistan 
where as part of the wider international efforts, 
and in close coordination with NATO and the UN, 
the EU has been deploying resources to train 
Afghan police, to support the country’s 
reconstruction – with a strong focus on health, 
education and agriculture – and has provided 
support to electoral processes and electoral 
observation. 
 
 The EU also provided a leading contribution in Aceh 
through a monitoring mission, in partnership with 
five ASEAN countries, which was completed in 2006 
and provided support to the peace process 
between the Government of Indonesia and the 
Free Aceh Movement.  
 
 In Timor Leste – where the EU provided support to 
the UN mission, as well as a strong development 
package; moreover the EU provided support to the 
electoral process and provided electoral 
observation. 
 
 The EU has been a constant supporter for a 
democratic transition in Myanmar: the EU has 
taken active part in the work of the Group of 
Friends of Myanmar chaired by the UN Secretary 
General and funded activities of the office of the 
UNSG Special Representative. Moreover, the EU 
had appointed its own special representative to 
focus its efforts concerning Myanmar. In the 
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the EU worked closely 
with international donors and with ASEAN to open 
channels to provide assistance to the population in 
need. Moreover as soon as the transition process 
started, the EU made good on its commitment and 
lifted sanctions on the regime, provided political 
support with high-level visits and deployed a high-
level political and economic task force to the 
country to deepen the engagement. 
 
 Going further, the EU in Myanmar is offering 
support to a number of very concrete projects: 
 
• Direct support to the Peace Process:  The EU 
has given 10 million euro to support the 
functioning and operations of the Myanmar 
Peace Centre’s (MPC). In addition, the EU 
supports ethnic and civil society actors, 
enabling them to fully take part in the peace 
process and addresses other concerns as 
expressed by the ethnic groups, including the 
setting up of a civilian ceasefire monitoring 
mechanism and transitional justice measures 
addressing the numerous cases of forced 
labour during the conflict.  
 
• Support to reform of Myanmar Police Force: 
As demanded by the Myanmar Government 
and also supported by the opposition (Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi), the EU is supporting the 
reform of the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) in 
the areas of crowd management and 
community policing with a 10m EUR package 
of support. So far the project has trained 
1419 police officers in crowd management. 
In addition, this EU project supports 
reforming the police doctrine and legal 
framework and works directly with 
representatives of Parliament to ensure 
better accountability of the police.  
 
• EU support to pilot de-mining actions: With 
3.5m EUR in funding, the IcSP supports pilot 
actions linked to alleviating the threat of 
mines.   
 
 Another good example of partnership is our work 
on disaster prevention and response with ASEAN 
and individual countries. The EU provided €52.6 
million to help the victims of natural disasters and 
is currently establishing a regional network of 
information-sharing and early warning systems for 
emergency situations with ASEAN.  The EU is 
supporting the ASEAN Centre for humanitarian 
response. In this framework , in March 2013, the 
EU signed a joint statement 'Building a Lasting EU-
Myanmar/Burma Partnership' that confirms EU’s 
intention to work together with Myanmar/Burma 
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on preparedness, response and resilience to 
emergencies by building up a professional and 
effective response system and through sharing of 
experience and capacity building. 
 
 The joint participation of the EEAS, the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and EU 
Member States (Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg) 
in the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise 2013 in Thailand 
in May 2013 underlined the above mentioned 
comprehensive approach of the EU to security. 
 
 In the Philippines, the EU is participating in support 
to the international organs established to assist the 
peace process and is providing resources for 
confidence-building measures in the south of the 
Philippines: 
 
• The EU contributes to the maintenance of a 
peaceful situation on the ground and to the 
improvement of the humanitarian and socio-
economic situation of conflict-affected 
population, thereby helping establish an 
environment conducive to the successful 
negotiation of a Peace Agreement.  
 
• The EU supports peace keeping and 
monitoring work of the International 
Monitoring Team (IMT) and of the members 
of its Civilian Protection Component: both 
Parties are kept fully informed of this 
monitoring work done by EU experts, local 
NGOs and other International personnel on 
incidents particularly related to humanitarian 
and human rights law which are regularly 
addressed by the parties themselves. 
 
• In the peace negotiations facilitated by the 
International Contact group (ICG), the EU 
supports the work of an International NGO 
which as a member of the Group advises the 
Parties during their negotiations. 
 
• Confidence and Peace building action: the EU 
supports the parties in jointly addressing 
issues such as joint clearance of unexploded 
ordnances. Additionally through EU funds, 
both Parties benefit from the services of 
Eminent People and technical advisors who 
provide critical advice and assistance. 
 
• Finally, the EU funds workshops and dialogue 
meetings to raise awareness of the 
significance of the Peace process to the 
various sectors of the population and 
community and to ensure people are aware 
of the importance of their involvement and 
contribution to the public consultation. 
 
What next? Options for closer partnership 
 
The overview of EU engagements and contribution to 
security in Asia shows that whilst there are numerous 
avenues for dialogue and many ongoing projects, they 
are not part of an overall strategy. This lack of strategy 
is perceived on both sides 
 
On the EU side,  
 
 There is a clear offer available to support new 
initiatives and there is willingness to get more 
engaged. However, there is no overall offer that 
would make it easier for countries in the region to 
identify avenues for closer partnership with the EU.   
 
 For example, the EU could define better what it is 
ready to do along the crisis cycle and define more 
in detail the instruments and tools that can be 
mobilized for mediation and preventive action; for 
confidence building and consolidation of post-crisis 
transitions; and for capacity building.  
 
 Moreover the EU needs to spell out to what extent 
it is willing to get involved in peace-keeping 
operations or civilian deployments in Asia (beyond 
the current involvement in Afghanistan). Would the 
EU be willing to provide support similar to what it 
does in Africa with the Africa Peace Facility? 
 
 There is growing interest on disaster preparedness 
in many Asian countries, notably in South East Asia. 
The EU has considerable experience in coordination 
of multinational efforts and in monitoring and early 
intervention. Building on the cooperation projects 
already launched with ASEAN and some of its 
members, the EU could explore the possibility of 
working on specific initiatives   
 
 Crucially, is the EU willing to consider more 
systematic involvement in confidence building type 
of measures, including track II diplomacy, teaming 
up with Asian countries willing to take more 
initiatives in the area of prevention, mediation, and 
addressing ‘fragile’ situation through international 
cooperation.  
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On the Asian side,  
 
 It is difficult to identify multilateral interlocutors for 
joint initiatives. There is no Asian security 
organization similar to the OSCE in Europe or the 
African Union in Africa. ASEAN remains a partner, 
but one that is still searching for its own mandate, 
limited as the organization is by the basic principles 
of non-interference in members’ internal affairs 
and with no mandate to act outside of its member’s 
area. The ARF initiative is a good framework for 
wider dialogue that the EU will continue to 
participate. The East Asia Summit is building up into 
a comprehensive organization addressing security 
issues at the highest political level, but has no real 
operational dimension and the EU’s request to 
participate in its work is still pending. 
 
 The EU is still not perceived as a security partner. 
The actions mentioned above are often seen as 
accompanying the most substantial role of the EU 
as a trade or development partner.  Asian partners 
could look at the EU as a possible source of 
mediation or support to multilateral mediation 
efforts to address some long-standing issues 
(claims over Sabah, or ethnic conflicts and 
separatist movements in south Thailand, or the 
Rohingya in Myanmar) 
 
Both sides could also explore cooperation on some 
global issues of common concern, creating coalitions of 
the willing rather than mere region to region dialogues, 
to address for example the issue of critical sea lanes of 
communications, or freedom of over-flight or cyber-
security, all issues on which both sides have clear 
interests in common. 
 
4. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
The EU will continue to develop its capabilities for crisis 
management interventions. As agreed by Heads of 
States and Government in December 2013, 
strengthening will affect both the EU’s capacity for 
civilian and military deployments as well as the capacity 
to act more ‘comprehensively’ when dealing with 
conflicts and tensions in third countries, bearing on all 
the confidence-building, incentives and sanctions at its 
disposal. However, the unanimous decision making 
required for EU’s deployments and the search for 
consensus will continue to limit the ability of the EU for 
rapid autonomous interventions. As a consequence the 
need for partnership and joint interventions with other 
actors is expected to remain the main framework for 
EU’s involvement in crisis situations.  
 
Looking at Asia, the strength and weaknesses of the 
EU’s current role in the area of security become more 
obvious. On one hand, the EU is active in a number of 
crisis situations and it plays a supporting role to 
transition and mediation processes. It has a know-how 
and access to resources that can be mobilized. And the 
EU can promote international coalitions using economic 
and political incentives. However the EU’s is not 
perceived as a natural security partner for countries in 
the region. 
 
The EU as a global security player will need to develop 
its role in Asia keeping pace with its economic and 
trade presence. From the short overview offered in this 
paper, it can be expected that developments will follow 
three dimensions: 
 
 The EU will strengthen its offers for partnership 
and joint action with countries in the region.  
Bilateral action (between the EU and individual 
countries) like in the Philippines or Myanmar now, 
will become more visible. Such partnerships will 
continue to depend on the willingness of the 
countries in the region to involve and cooperate 
with the EU; 
 
 The EU will continue to pursue a multilateral 
agenda, with a stronger focus on global challenges 
such as the implications of climate change for 
security, the fight against maritime piracy, or cyber-
security. In order to promote global action, the EU 
will need to develop closer international alliances; 
the contribution of Asian countries to the need for 
international coalitions will be necessary for the 
success of multilateral action; 
 
 The EU will be ready to engage in the development 
of Asian regional dialogues for security. The Asian 
Regional Forum, ASEM and eventually the East Asia 
Summit will offer further opportunities for closer 
EU-Asian engagement. 
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